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mong ethicists, a debate rages over the applicability and use-
fulness of the just war ethic (Yoder 1984). Critics question the
~. credibility of the just war tradition, arguing that just war pre-
cepts are either so ambiguous or so watered-down that they can offer
no moral guidance. Supposedly, policy-makers end up embracing either
moral crusades or a &dquo;blank check&dquo; national interest ethic, even though
the rhetoric of just war ethics might be employed for public effect. It is
interesting that no empirical evidence exists regarding these issues. In
attempting to shed light on these matters, we surveyed three elite
groups influential in U.S. foreign policy: American newspaper editors,
foreign service officers, and Catholic clergy serving in the United
States. Using American-Nicaraguan relations as a test case, our goal
was to determine whether these elites adhered to the criteria for justi-
fiable resort to war found in the traditional literature.
Because of its coherence and importance as an ethical approach,
we have drawn heavily from Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars
(1977) for our organizing framework. Walzer is a normative ethicist
whose work falls within the &dquo;just war tradition,&dquo; which embraces mainly
Christian just war doctrine, international law, elements of military
thought, and contributions from various academic scholars (see Johnson
1981: xxi-xxiv). Just war thought establishes criteria on when resort to
war is morally justifiable (i.e., the issue of jus ad bellum) and how war
should be fought (jus in bello). Walzer’s work addresses both sets of
issues, although here we draw only upon his views regarding the
former. In the following sections we identify various moral views on
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warfare, including the just war tradition, describe our research design,
and present our empirical findings.
MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WAR
On the question of the moral justifications for war, the just war
principles of &dquo;just cause&dquo; and &dquo;last resort&dquo; are central (e.g., see Cohen
1989; Lackey 1989; Johnson 1981, 1984; National Conference of Cath-
olic Bishops 1983; O’Brien 1981; Ramsey 1961; Tucker 1966; Walzer
1977). The just cause principle states that resort to war is justifiable
only as a defensive response to an armed attack which threatens sub-
stantial harm to a victim nation, a requirement that is also the main
thrust of international law (Lackey 1989: 33-36). The last resort prin-
ciple holds that war is not justified unless all peaceful methods for con-
flict resolution have been exhausted. This requirement was most rele-
vant in earlier centuries when just cause was defined to include the
righting of &dquo;wrongs received,&dquo; where such wrongs might be of lesser
gravity than actual armed attack. The current restrictive definition of
just cause in both Christian just war doctrine and international law,
however, diminishes the independent status of the last resort principle
(see Johnson 1984: 24-25).
Although Christian just war doctrine stresses just cause as defined
above and justifies that which we label as &dquo;defensive war,&dquo; Walzer has
examined the morality of several other types of war. These include
preventive war, preemptive war, humanitarian intervention, and mil-
itary intervention to protect the right of national self-determination.
The following are Walzer’s assessments of the morality of these cate-
gories of war.
Defensive War
Walzer fully supports defensive war as a morally justifiable response
to actual armed attack, which is central to the just war doctrine. His
contribution to just war thought lies in his examination of the morality
of the other categories of war.
Preventive War
Preventive war is rejected by most other contemporary just war
theorists (but for an important exception, see Ramsey 1961, 1968).
We include this category of war for examination because of its impor-
tance in discussions of American policy as will be noted below. A pre-
ventive war is launched against a state considered likely to commit
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aggression in the near or even the long-term future. The usual sce-
nario cited by advocates of preventive war is that of a military balance
shifting in favor of a potential aggressor who might eventually become
militarily superior to some potential victim state. The advocates of
preventive war argue that such war is moral because it is really a
&dquo;defensive war.&dquo; Its purpose is to prevent future successful aggressive
war by the &dquo;bully&dquo; state. Morality should allow potential victims the
right of unilateral defense while they still hold the military advantage,
particularly since the international system lacks effective centralized
peace-keeping capabilities.
The moral arguments against preventive war center on the last
resort principle. According to this principle, methods short of war
should be tried first to deal with potential problems, e.g., diplomacy,
arms control, or an arms buildup to maintain the balance of power. A
preventive war is an early resort to the exclusion of lesser means.
Critics of preventive war also argue that governments may err in
estimating the intent of another state, and launching a preventive war
is choosing the certain evil of war over the uncertain evil of future
aggression.
Preemptive War
Like preventive war, a preemptive war involves striking first. How-
ever, the scenario here is that of a clear and immediate danger, as for
instance, when the armed forces of another state are mobilized and
moving toward one’s borders presumably to attack. The moral justifi-
cation for a preemptive war is that morality should not condemn a
state to wait for an actual crossing of its borders; a state should have
the advantage of striking first in order to preempt and defeat an obvi-
ous aggressor. Walzer and other just war theorists generally are recep-
tive to the preemptive argument, but with the caveat that a preemp-
tive strike should be based on solid evidence of an imminent attack.
Humanitarian Intervention
International law asserts the fundamental rights of states to sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, and the fundamental duty to refrain
from forceful interference in the internal affairs of other states. Work-
ing from a theory of human rights, Walzer stresses that the legal rights
and duties of states derive ultimately from the moral rights of individ-
uals to life and liberty, and the individual moral duty not to deprive
innocents of life.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016prq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
544
An exception to a state’s inviolate right to sovereignty can occur
when a government uses its right to freedom from outside interference
to violate the human rights of its citizenry by engaging in genocidal
behavior or by acting inhumanely toward foreign residents. Assuming
that the international community refuses to act, a &dquo;protector&dquo; state
may take unilateral military action for the humanitarian purpose of
protecting the innocent. The conditional factors on such intervention
are that the intervening state should be motivated by humanitarian
and not selfish political purposes, and that no immediate alternative
exists for rescuing the innocent, the so-called last resort requirement.
Intervention to Protect National Self-Determination
The morality of force to protect the right of national self-
determination has been a matter of debate among scholars in recent
years, particularly in connection with the so-called Reagan Doctrine
of aiding &dquo;freedom fighters&dquo; attempting to overthrow Marxist govern-
ments, e.g., Nicaragua, or to defeat Soviet military intervention, e.g.,
Afghanistan (see Johnson 1988). The heart of this debate concerns the
proper interpretation of the right of national self-determination. Walzer
(1977) supports the more common interpretation embedded in inter-
national law.
He argues that the right of national self-determination is the right
of a people to determine their political system and domestic affairs free
of external intervention. National self-determination implies a political
process that can range from electoral democracy to civil war. Although
strongly supporting the value system that underlies democracy, Walzer
stresses the argument of John Stuart Mill that democracy and the con-
ditions necessary for its survival cannot simply be imposed by outsid-
ers. Expressed differently, the argument is that the existence of a dic-
tatorial system or civil war does not imply a lack of self-determination
as long as outsiders are not interfering to determine the outcome of the
political process. Accordingly, a &dquo;protector&dquo; state can use military force
to protect another state’s right of national self-determination only when
there has been a prior military intervention by a third state. Hence,
military action to protect self-determination must always be counter-
intervention. In addition, when intervention has been defeated, the
forces of the counter-intervening state must leave the victim state and
not stay to impose its own governmental system, an act which itself
would be a violation of the right to national self-determination.
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According to this reasoning, American aid to the resistance forces
in Afghanistan was morally justifiable because of prior Soviet military
intervention. However, American support for the Nicaraguan Contras
violated the Nicaraguan right to self-determination since the Sandinista
government came to power through an internal process rather than
through military action by outsiders.
ATTACKS ON JUST WAR THINKING
Among ethicists and theologians, criticisms against the just war
tradition have grown, especially since the Vietnam War and the debate
over U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the 1980s. Critics argue that most
Americans do not follow the just war tradition, though its rhetoric is
freely employed. Instead, it is argued that the majority really adheres
to a crusader (&dquo;this is a war against godless communism&dquo;) or a national
interest (&dquo;my country, right or wrong&dquo;) ethic (Yoder 1984).
At a minimum, contend critics, the just war tradition can be made
credible only if its criteria can be shown to exercise effective policy
restraints. &dquo;What needs therefore to be tested is whether (just war)
criteria can really function so as in any specific cases to exclude a
particular cause, a particular weapon, a particular strategy, a partic-
ular tactical move&dquo; (Yoder 1984: 9). The issue of credibility seems to
divide naturally into two questions:
1). Are the just war concepts clear enough to allow judgments to
be made in foreign policy contexts?
2). Can constraining cases of negative moral judgment against
military actions be identified?
On the first question, critics argue that the just war tenets are too
ambiguous to provide guidance. Their case may be summarized as
follows: there exists no formal operational statement on how the just
war theory should work (Yoder 1983: 46 ff, 58 ff, 477 f~. It has not
been translated into legal, political, or military form; its meaning is
taken simply as self-evident. That a government is &dquo;legitimate,&dquo; that a
war is &dquo;defensive,&dquo; that a military operation is a situation of &dquo;last
resort,&dquo; that one evil is &dquo;proportionate&dquo; to another, and so on are all
judgments that the just war doctrine assumes can be made with some
confidence, consensus, and accuracy.
But often it is precisely because there is no agreement on these
matters that wars are fought. For example, revolutionary wars erupt
because there is disagreement over legitimate authority. Or opinions
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on what constitutes &dquo;last resort&dquo; will differ depending on which party
benefits from the status quo. In a pluralistic world composed of com-
peting political groups, people will never agree on what constitutes a
just government, a just cause, or a just war (Childress 1980). Hence,
because of these ambiguities it is doubtful that the just war tradition
can offer concrete moral guidance on policy matters.
On the possibility of identifying principled negative judgments
against war, just war critics remain skeptical. If the meaning of such
precepts is problematical, then how can one expect to hold the line
against the pressures of political expedience and special pleading?
Under these circumstances, one would expect to find many principled
justifications for politically expedient wars, but few principled objec-
tions to such wars. Testing the validity of these conjectures for various
American foreign policy elites is the concern of the following sections.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Studies of American elite groups concerning such moral issues are
rare because it is difficult to obtain access to these individuals. Our
survey results were obtained in 1987 using mail questionnaires that
were sent randomly to selected national samples of three elite groups.
Regarding American diplomats, a letter describing our project
and asking for voluntary encouragement of foreign service officer (FSO)
participation was sent to the chief of mission of all American foreign
service posts. A similar letter was sent to the public affairs officer at
each post, and a varied number of questionnaires ranging from three
to thirty, depending upon the size of the post, was included for distri-
bution to all willing FSOs. Post information was drawn from Depart-
ment of State Publication 7877: Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts (Sep-
tember 1986). A total of 2800 questionnaires was mailed in this manner
and 511 completed surveys were returned, but we have no way of
knowing how many actually were distributed to diplomatic personnel
as the responses to our efforts were quite varied. Some chiefs of mis-
sion had additional questionnaires copied for distribution to personnel,
while others refused to participate. Categorized by rank, 20 percent of
the FSO respondents were senior diplomats, 52 percent midlevel, and
29 percent junior officers. By area of specialization, 15 percent were
administrative, 12 percent consular, 17 percent economic, 37 percent
political, 13 percent United States Information Service, and 6 percent
other specializations.
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The Catholic clergy respondents were obtained from a random
sample of the 18,459 priests assigned to parishes in the United States.
Our source for addresses was The Official Catholic Directory (November
1986). We sent our questionnaire to 1518 priests and all 382 members
of the American heirarchy. The response rates were 25 percent and 22
percent, respectively, for the priests and the hierarchy. A sample of
newspaper editorial page editors was drawn at random from the listing
of individuals who worked for American daily newspapers in 1987.
The list was provided by the Editor and Publisher Company of New
York City. Our questionnaire was sent to 1586 individuals, and 371
returned completed forms, which is a response rate of 23 percent.’ I
In examining the views of elite groups on the jus ad bellum issues of
war, we used Walzer’s categories of war. We chose substantive scenar-
ios patterned from contemporary American-Nicaraguan relations as a
focal point in our survey since moral arguments regarding Central
American were prominent during the latter 1980s (Johnson 1988;
Kornbluh 1987: 169-212; Lacey 1986; Miles 1986; Secrest 1986; Walker
1987).
The first part of the survey consisted of thirty-four Likert items
designed to measure support for a dozen doctrines and interrelated
concepts concerning war. These items were laced with the terminol-
ogy of moral judgment, and a cover letter instructed respondents to
use their own judgment in interpreting the meanings of these terms.
The next part of the survey consisted of a series of scenarios describing
possible Nicaraguan policies or actions. Respondents were asked to
check all the situations &dquo;that you feel are serious enough to justify the
U.S. going to war with Nicaragua.&dquo; These scenarios were designed to
measure support and opposition for most of the Walzer war justifica-
tion categories as these applied to American debates on Nicaragua
circa 1986. However, no interpretive guidance or just war terminology
accompanied the Nicaraguan scenarios or the preceding items. Hence,
’ Our questionnaires included a number of other items relevant to issues of interna-
tional conflict and separate set of descriptors for each group of elite respondents.
We acknowledge the possibility that the individuals who were most interested in
our survey chose to participate, but if that was the case, it did not affect the basic
structure of elite attitudes. While these results are not reported here, the struc-
ture exhibited by other American elites is virtually identical to that observed
among the American military (Brunk et al. 1990), which had a much higher
response rate to our survey. A copy of each of the three questionnaires can be
obtained by writing the authors.
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the survey was designed to measure agreement with the substantive
positions of Walzer’s assessments, but not to indicate whether respon-
dents were aware of or supportive of the just war tradition or compet-
ing doctrines.
ELITE AGREEMENT WITH JUST WAR NORMS
The percentages of individuals who indicated that each situation
would justify the United States going to war with Nicaragua are pre-
sented in Table 1. The category of war described in each of the sce-
narios is given in parentheses. The scenarios are arranged in order of
the general level of support for going to war, and did not appear in
this order in the questionnaire.2 2
TABLE 1
SITUATIONS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE U.S. GOING TO WAR WITH NICARAGUA
2 The item asked individuals to, &dquo;Please check all the situations below that you feel are
serious enough to justify the U.S. going to war with Nicaragua.&dquo;
A. If Nicaragua sends aid (arms, money, advisers, etc.) to communist revolution-
ary movements in neighboring countries.
B. If Nicaragua sets up a communist government.
C. If Nicaragua invites Soviet military bases to be set up within its borders.
D. If Nicaragua starts a military buildup that overshadows its neighboring states.
E. If there is clear evidence that Nicaragua is going to join an attack on the U.S.
F. If Nicaragua invades a neighboring country.
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Elite Support for Defensive War
The heart of Walzer’s analysis is that war should be waged to
defend against actual armed attack. The three elite groups showed
strong agreement with this fundamental justification. An average of
76.1 percent of the respondents supported war against Nicaragua as
justifiable in the case of imminent Nicaraguan attack against the United
States (scenario F).3 The respondents were less supportive of war to
defend another nation that was a victim of direct Nicaraguan aggres-
sion (Scenario E). This justification received majority support only
from the FSOs (62.9 percent) and 48.2 percent average support from
the three groups. The result suggests an overall attitude of moderation
among respondents, rather than one of &dquo;hawkishness.&dquo;
The survey results for scenario C where Nicaragua provides aid to
communist revolutionaries in adjacent countries also are relevant. In
international law, such actions are considered &dquo;intervention&dquo; in the
affairs of other countries, or &dquo;indirect aggression,&dquo; rather than
&dquo;aggression&dquo; in the sense of armed attack that can justify a defensive
war response (von Glahn 1981: 576-85). A large percentage agreed
with this distinction. Only 14.8 percent saw this scenario as a legiti-
mate justification for military action against Nicaragua. This position
potentially put all three groups into conflict with the Reagan Admin-
istration, which labeled such actions as &dquo;Nicaraguan (and Cuban)
aggression, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union,&dquo; and claimed that
American security policies toward Central America were &dquo;to deter and
defend against aggression.... We help our friends help themselves&dquo;
(Reagan 1984: 134).
This American justification was addressed by the World Court in
Nicaragua v United States (1986). The Court ruled that customary inter-
national law held that the supplying of arms by Nicaragua to rebel
groups in El Salavador and other Central American states, which the
Court thought had ended by 1981, was &dquo;intervention&dquo; rather than
&dquo;armed attack.&dquo; While a violation of international law, it was not seri-
ous enough to justify the hostile measures taken by the United States
in the name of &dquo;collective defense.&dquo; Moreover, the Court held that the
mining of Nicaraguan harbors and attacks against oil installations by
the United States were violations of obligations under international
law &dquo;not to use force against another state.&dquo; The Court also ruled that
3 In such instances "average" refers to the average of responses of the three separate
elite groups, rather than the average of the sum of all individuals from the three
groups.
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American arming, training, and supplying of the Contras was illegal
intervention in Nicaraguan affairs (Henken et al. 1987: 708-36).
Support for Preventive War
Two of the scenarios involved the justifiability of preventive war.
In scenario D, Nicaragua &dquo;invites Soviet military bases to be set up
within its borders,&dquo; while in scenario B, &dquo;Nicaragua starts a military
build-up that overshadows its neighboring states.&dquo; For the latter sce-
nario, the three elite groups overwhelmingly rejected war as only 7.3
percent considered such Nicaraguan actions as a justification for Amer-
ican military action. In the case of Soviet bases (scenario D), there
also was substantial opposition, although a larger percentage (34.1 I
percent) supported this justification.
The preventive war argument was central in the Reagan
Administration’s justification of its hostile policies toward the Sandinistas.
Administration officials contended that the Sandinista government
already had amassed conventional forces that gave it military superi-
ority over its Central American neighbors; that it had allowed Nicara-
guan territory to become a strategic military asset for Soviet naval and
air power; and that Nicaragua was quickly becoming a Soviet bastion
(Shultz 1986). Aside from the accuracy of these charges, none of the
survey groups, including the FSOs, showed much support for preven-
tive war as a moral category in the Nicaraguan secnario.
Elite Views on the Self-Determination Issue
The final scenario (A) involved the issue of war or military inter-
vention to protect the right of national self-determination. To recall,
Walzer considers national self-determination to be violated if an out-
side power militarily intervenes to control another state’s affairs, and a
justifiable war to protect the right of self-determination would have to
be a responsive act of counter-intervention against an initial intruder.
Accordingly, the existence of a communist system would not necessarily
represent the absence of self-determination if it was the product of
internal political developments. A contrasting position is taken by
Krauthammer (1986) in support of the Reagan Doctrine applied to
Nicaragua. He equates self-determination with electoral democracy
and therefore considers American aid to the Nicaraguan &dquo;freedom
fighters&dquo; as fully supportive of the national self-determination principle.
Our surveyed elite groups supported the position embodied in
Walzer’s more conventional understanding of the meaning of national
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self-determination. Over 95 percent of them considered the establish-
ment of a communist system in Nicaragua not to be a sufficient justi-
fication for war.
COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
Factor analysis is a technique that allows for an examination of
underlying cognitive structure. As a methodology, it has the substan-
tial added advantage that the amount of variance explained by impor-
tant factors is a measure of the shared, systematic component to elite
reasoning. This is not possible to determine by examining simple fre-
quency counts. An analysis of this shared variance, in turn, should
reveal in more detail the underlying structure to American elite atti-
tudes regarding international conflict issues.
A general pattern is evident in Table 1 upon close inspection. For
scenarios D, E and F, the clergy expressed substantially less support
for each justification than did the secular elites. This pattern changes
for scenarios A, B and C where we see a smaller percentage of support
from the three groups, but almost equal levels of support. These results
suggest that American elite standards of normative judgment on
such issues do not necessarily comprise a unidimensional scale of
attitudinal positions, but are composed of at least two dimensions of
evaluation.
A factor analysis confirms this speculation. The results from a
varimax rotation are presented in Table 2 and show that the responses
to scenarios A, B and C are strongly associated. The same is true for
scenarios E and F, while scenario D is moderately correlated with each
TABLE 2
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSES
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dimension. In total these two dimensions explain 57.2 percent of the
variance in responses. They are only moderately related to one another,
as is shown by an oblique analysis in which the factors are seen to
have a correlation of 0.26.
The difference between the two dimensions seems to be one of
direct versus indirect threat. Dimension two clearly represents actions
that present a direct and imminent threat to the United States or its
Central American allies. The scenarios of dimension one correspond
to annoyances, but not direct threats. This two-factor solution suggests
that another variable besides simple belief in the particular efficacy of
normative principles is important in the evaluation of warfare.
IDEOLOGY AND SUPPORT FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
Elite responses have a clear pattern in that support for American
military action increases as the severity of the Nicaraguan threat
increases. We will now examine what factors besides ethical beliefs
may influence opinions about resort to war. While Brunk et al. (1990)
reported that the most important predictor of warfare attitudes among
the military was political ideology, they also discovered a variety of
other factors that were weakly related to such attitudes. We therefore
asked a series of questions about one’s administrative position, func-
tional specialization, and various personal characteristics. Our reason-
ing was that different experiences might expose a person to different
types of normative problems and thus influence one’s opinions on war-
fare issues. However, we quickly determined that the only variable
that makes a major difference on elite attitudes is poltitical ideology.
This was measured in our surveys by asking individuals to indicate
&dquo;What is your political viewpoint?&dquo; Possible answers were &dquo;liberal,&dquo;
&dquo;moderate,&dquo; and &dquo;conservative.&dquo; A pattern emerges here. Consistently
across all three groups the liberals are less accepting of justifications
for war against Nicaragua, conservatives are the most accepting of
such justifications, and moderates lie between the two.
In Table 3 we examine the positions of liberals, moderates, and
conservatives on each of the six individual items concerning justifica-
tions for military action. The two scenarios for justifying war that are
rejected by most individuals concern the adoption of a communist
government by Nicaragua (A) and a military buildup by that country
(B). These are overwhelmingly rejected by both liberals and moder-
ates, but receive some support from conservatives among all three elite
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groups. In the most extreme cases for the justification of a war against
Nicaragua, a small minority of conservatives find themselves at odds
with almost all the liberals and moderates, and these conservatives
even are pitted against most of their fellow conservatives.
TABLE 3
PERCENT SUPPORTING JUSTIFICATIONS BY IDEOLOGICAL POSITION
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Two scenarios for the resort to war receive only lukewarm support.
These are whether Nicaragua aids communist movements in other
countries (C) and whether it allows Soviet bases to be established
within its borders (D). Here the demarcation between ideological groups
can still be seen, but there is no longer a natural alliance between
liberals and moderates. Instead, gaps develop among the support rates
of all three groups.
Examining the final two questions (E and F) concerning actual
Nicaraguan aggresssion shows that there is still some hesitancy among
these American elites to use military force. The tendency of liberals is
still to feel that American military action against Nicaragua is not jus-
tified, and almost 40 percent of liberals oppose American action even
if Nicaragua is about to join in an attack on the U.S. Interestingly, the
moderates shift closer to the conservatives, which suggests that a
conservative-moderate alliance forms when the United States is faced
with conditions of actual aggression.
DISCUSSION
Our research provides the first empirical evidence supporting the
credibility of just war theory. In doing so we have provided answers to
our initial inquiries. First, are the just war concepts clear enough to
allow consistent judgments to be made in foreign policy context? Our
study answers yes. The survey patterns suggest our respondents were
able to respond to various war scenarios in a systematic way that is
consistent with contemporary just war doctrine. Our factor analysis
showed that direct threat scenarios were distinguished from indirect
threats by the respondents in a clean, orderly manner. Also, the scale-
like rankings of the scenarios from least to most &dquo;war-justifiable&dquo; and
the systematic respondent variation along ideological lines both sug-
gest that respondents were making systematic judgments. Just war
advocates claim that their criteria are self-evident to all and applicable
to all. Hence, evidence that people do in fact share a common under-
standing analogous to just war criteria is a key element in establishing
its credibility as a moral guideline.
Assuming that at least part of the respondents share a just war
outlook, does such thinking produce meaningful policy restraints? Our
findings again suggest a positive answer in at least three ways. First,
the survey responses clearly display a reluctance to wage war. As
noted earlier, only in the scenarios involving actual Nicaraguan aggres-
sion do clear elite majorities find war supportable, and even this sup-
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port is lukewarm. Such sentiments are consistent with the just war
tradition’s teaching that war is justifiable only if clearly defensive.
There is no evidence of a strong, expedient realpolitik view of war or
of a predominant anti-communist crusading view. This is again con-
sistent with the just war tradition’s teaching that war is a last resort
measure, that one should be predisposed against war, and that the
burden of proof always rests with the advocates of war.
Second, a reluctance to wage war seems not to be a product of
reason of state thinking. Given the extreme power disparity between
the U.S. and Nicaragua, and the geopolitical threats contained in
some of the scenarios that were rejected by our respondents, we believe
that respondent restraint is unlikely to be a product of reason in state
calculations, at least of the Machiavellian variety. Similarly, one can
discount an anti-communist crusading outlook. Elite restraint, there-
fore, seems to be a rejection in principle of the &dquo;blank check&dquo; under-
standing of reason of state, realism, realpolitik, national interest, neces-
sity, and moral crusading.
One might argue that our respondents’ defensive outlook and mil-
itary restraint, while consistent with just war reasoning, are really pro-
ducts of realist calculations. Perhaps geopolitical prudence and national
interest, rather than moral judgments, are at play here. No matter
how altruistic a policy choice might appear, it usually is possible to
construct an alternative, &dquo;national interest&dquo; explanation. While we can-
not completely discount the idea that these elites were responding to
some higher order, amoral realism, we believe it is more likely that
they were weighing both moral just war considerations and practical
concerns. When assessing risk and war issues in the abstract, even the
American military incorporate evaluative frameworks that utilize both
practical and just war components (Brunk et al. 1990). It is possible
that when faced with a specific scenario regarding Nicaragua, our
respondents shifted solely to amoral reasoning, but this seems unlikely.
Might the practicality of prudence alone, uninfluenced by moral
concerns, account for elite choices? While this too cannot be discounted
completely, we again think it unlikely. Prudence is an extremely ambig-
uous and weak policy guide (Smith 1986: 216, 234-38). It serves as a
general precept that is seen by elites as spanning almost all moral and
reason of state frameworks (Brunk et al. 1990: 98-99). It cannot serveas
a distinguishing, alternative explanation. Similar objections can be
raised against purely national interest or reason of state explanations
in trying to account for the systematic, elite responses. In urging that
government be guided by the pursuit of national interests or reasons of
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state, there is no agreement among advocates of this view as to what
these interests are in either a theoretical or practical sense. This vague-
ness is especially evident on an issue like Nicaragua where even basic
matters of fact are often in dispute.
For these reasons, we believe that the consistency of elite judge-
ments on Nicaragua and just war precepts reflects the influence of
those precepts. We do not deny that practical, political calculations
entered into elite decisions, but we feel that these calculations were not
the sole considerations and that just war elements played an important
role in respondent attitudes.
However, some qualifications accompany our findings. First, we
do not know the limits of our respondents’ commitment to the substan-
tive content of just war norms. If the price of following such norms is
too high, they might be abandoned. For example, evidence exists that
some military officers would ignore moral restrictions if the very exist-
ence of their &dquo;in group&dquo; was at stake (Brunk et al. 1990). Similarly,
&dquo;last ditch defense&dquo; thinking may be hidden among our three elites. As
a matter for future research, changing the general scenario to one
involving a nuclear superpower as the rival state would highlight these
matters. Second, we must distinguish the conceptual and individual
prerequisites of the just war tradition from the social prerequisites that
allow the just war criteria to operate. Our findings address only the
former, but individual judgements are not the same as organizational
behavior. We do not know what sorts of institutional forms and deci-
sion making processes are most suitable for bringing organizational
policy implementation in line with the just war criteria. Finally, we do
not know to what extent elite restraints reflect enduring moral con-
cerns, as opposed to transitory, historical sensitivities, such as the
Vietnam syndrome.
As for the current America-Nicaragua controversy, we can specu-
late about the policy implications of these survey results. One signifi-
cant aspect of American policy in the context of morality is the impor-
tance that the Reagan Administration apparently assigned to taking
the &dquo;moral high ground&dquo; in the domestic policy arena. National secu-
rity strategists within the Administration considered Vietnam-like &dquo;low
intensity conflict&dquo; (LIC) to be the main Soviet threat in the foreseeable
future (e.g., see Larkin 1986; Klare and Kornbluh 1987; Miles 1986;
Walker 1987). The Administration’s LIC strategy was the culmination
of almost two decades of study on why America lost in Vietnam. One
conclusion reached was that the &dquo;hearts and minds&dquo; of the American
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people had not been won for the Vietnam commitment. From this
conclusion it followed that public support was essential for success in
the anticipated struggle for the Third World, and part of this support
would have to be based on the moral sensibilities of the American
public. As expressed by a Pentagon study, American LIC strategy was
a &dquo;carefully created, sophisticated and ongoing public diplomatic effort&dquo;
to establish that the Reagan Doctrine was necessary for both national
security and moral reasons (Klare and Kornbluh 1987b: 14; Kornbluh
1987; 159-212; also see Miles 1986; Walker 1987).
Whether the &dquo;moral&dquo; approach of the Reagan Administration was
just a tactic to a sincere commitment, it is clear that the Administration’s
public justifications for hostile policies toward Nicaragua were laced
with moral terminology. Nicaragua was called a &dquo;totalitarian jungle&dquo;
and a &dquo;communist reign of terror,&dquo; and the Contras were described as
&dquo;freedom fighters.&dquo; The Sandinistas were committing &dquo;aggression&dquo; against
their neighbors. Cuban-Nicaraguan communist subversion posed a
threat to all of Central America, Mexico, and eventually the southern
border of the United States. This made American help to its Central
American allies defensive in nature and &dquo;morally ... the only right
thing to do&dquo; (see Reagan 1984).
Public opinion surveys conducted during the Reagan period indi-
cated a lack of support for the Administration’s policy toward Nicara-
gua, but they did not examine attitudes on the major moral aspects of
the controversy (e.g., see Kenworthy 1987). Our evidence indicates
that American elites disagreed with the Administration’s moral and
legal justifications for its anti-Nicaraguan policies. Although ideologi-
cal orientation was important in determining the degree of restraint
among elite respondents, even a majority of the less restrained conser-
vatives only supported American military action as a direct response
to Nicaraguan aggression or as a preventive action. While the liberal-
conservative distinction is an important component of attitudinal posi-
tions on the moral issues surrounding resort to war, the attitudes of
American elites on international conflict issues appear to be generated
by even more fundamental principles than political ideology.
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